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value is regarded as significant. A period of fertility crisis is defined as any year in which incomplete total fertility was more than 15 percent below the average value of the mid-1950s. "Total fertility loss" is defined as the sum of those significant (i.e., more than 15 percent) annual percentage shortfalls during the years of crisis. Total fertility loss is thus expressed as a percentage of one year's total births to women aged 15-39 years under normal conditions. Fertility compensation can be estimated in a similar way. Finally, "net fertility loss," obtained by subtracting total fertility compensation from total fertility loss, is the net effect of the fertility crisis.
For China as a whole, total fertility up to age 39 was about 5.6 births per woman in pre-Leap years. It fell slightly in 1958 to 5.2 and declined sharply in the years 1959-61. In 1961 total fertility to age 39 dropped to its lowest level, 3.06, more than 45 percent below the pre-Leap level. But in 1962 a recovery set in, and in 1963 a peak value of 6.9 was reached, the highest level recorded since 1949. In 1964 fertility returned to levels prevailing in the precrisis period. The national figure for the total fertility loss during 1959-61 was about 109 percent, or more than a year's births under the mid1950s fertility regime. On the assumption that the birth rate would have remained at its pre-Leap level without the crisis, births lost or postponed amounted to some 25 million during 1958-62. Table 1 , where provinces are ranked in order of total fertility loss (col. 4). One can see from the table that the fertility crisis was countrywide and that a three-year period of crisis, from 1959-61, was common. The timing and severity of the crisis, however, varied greatly between provinces. Fertility crisis (i.e., incomplete total fertility more than 15 percent below the reference value) lasted four years in six out of 25 provinces but only two years in four other provinces. The crisis was briefest in Heilongjiang, where a significant deficit occurred only in 1961. So far as the magnitude of the crisis is concerned, the total fertility loss varied substantially by province, being least severe in Heilongjiang at 31 percent and most severe-approaching a deficit of about two normal years' total births to women aged 15-39 yearsin Anhui. In more than half of all provinces the index of total fertility loss exceeded 100 percent, or the equivalent of one year's births under the mid1950s fertility regime.
Provincial patterns Provincial patterns of the timing and extent of fertility crisis are estimated in
A striking feature of the data is the regional clustering of the severity of the fertility crisis (see Figure 1) . Four groups of provinces are distinguished by their total fertility loss. The first group contains the most severely affected provinces, the fourth those least affected. The two most severely affected provinces were Anhui and Sichuan, where the index of total fertility loss exceeded 165 percent. The five adjacent provinces north of Anhui also suffered severely, as did the vast areas to the north and south of Sichuan. These 13 provinces in which the total fertility loss exceeded one normal year's total births are situated in the middle of China, from the east coast to the remote interior, with a gap in the center. In southeastern China, fertility losses were more moderate. All five provinces in this region, together with some provinces in the central north-south belt, fall into the third group. The provinces in which the fertility loss was smallest (the index was less than 65 percent) were Heilongjiang, Jilin, Neimonggu (Inner Mongolia), Shanxi, and Xinjiang. In general, the extreme northern and southern provinces suffered least, while central China was hardest hit.
Fertility recovery was pronounced in 1962, when indexes of incomplete total fertility returned to normal levels in all but two provinces (Sichuan and Liaoning). In some provinces the recovery had begun even earlier. This was the case in Anhui, one of the earliest provinces to be affected by the crisis and one in which the fertility loss had been exceptionally severe. The recovery was followed in 1963 by the largest fertility boom in the history of the People's Republic. The boom did not last long, however, and by 1964 fertility had retured to mid-1950s levels in most provinces.
In no province was the total fertility loss during the crisis period fully compensated for, irrespective of the absolute magnitude of the loss. An extreme example is provided by Sichuan Province: even after recovery, the net fertility loss in this province still exceeded 160 percent of a normal year's births (col. 10). For China as a whole, the net fertility loss amounted to about 90 percent of a normal year's births, and in only three provinces was it less than 40 percent. of the Great Leap Rural-urban differences Since China's population is predominantly rural, the rural fertility crisis was similar to that of the nation as a whole.
The fertility crisis occurred at roughly the same time in urban and rural areas (see Table 1 ), but a short time lag was found in several provinces. During the early stages of the crisis, the urban populations fared relatively better. By 1961, however, the fertility crisis in the majority of urban areas was as bad as, or worse than, that in the countryside. Moreover, the rural areas recovered from the crisis more quickly than did urban areas.
For China as a whole, total fertility loss in the rural areas exceeded that in urban areas by about 15 percent. But in 12 provinces, including eight in the far north or northeast of China and three in the south, urban fertility losses exceeded those in the countryside. Most of these provinces experienced comparatively moderate rural fertility loss. Apart from the three large municipalities, total urban fertility loss was as great as or greater than one normal year's births in nine provinces; total rural fertility loss was this high in 15 provinces. On the other hand, the indexes of urban fertility loss were less than 75 percent in three eastern coastal provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian) and in five contiguous provinces forming a north-south band traversing the middle of the country (Heilongjiang, Neimonggu, Shanxi, Henan, and Hubei). Regional differences in fertility crisis were less pronounced in urban than in rural areas.
In all three major cities the shortfall in fertility lasted for at least four years, and in each case the total fertility loss was higher than the national average. Shanghai is a special case: the fertility decline in that city began in 1958, and full recovery has never occurred. Even in 1963, when the rest of the country experienced a baby boom, the index of incomplete fertility in Shanghai was about 20 percent below the level of the mid-1950s. Beijing and Tianjin, on the other hand, were closer to the national pattern. Fertility in these two cities recovered in 1963, but only in Beijing was the compensation sizable, amounting to about 20 percent above the level of the mid-i1950s. After 1964 the trend in Beijing and Tianjin was similar to that in Shanghai. In fact, China's urban fertility transition predated, and to some extent overlapped with, the fertility crisis. It is impossible to separate the fertility impact of these two phenomena. Therefore, the measures used here probably overestimate the effects of fertility crisis in the urban areas, especially in the three major municipalities.
Excess mortality
China experienced very rapid mortality decline during the 1950s. According to one set of figures, the national crude death rate fell from 20 per thousand population in 1949 to 14 in 1953, and to 10.8 per thousand in 1957, a 46 percent decline in this eight-year period. This monumental achievement to a large extent was attributable to the cessation of warfare, a reduction in the degree of extreme poverty, and great improvements in health care.5 Increased fertility, which affected the age composition of the population, also contributed to the decline in the crude death rate.6
This downward trend in mortality, however, was reversed after the launch of the Great Leap Forward. The national death rate rose slightly in 1958 and reached a peak of 25.4 per thousand in 1960, only returning to pre-Leap levels in 1962.7 If we assume that the national crude death rate would have remained at the levels of 1956 and 1957 without the Leap, then excess mortality, defined as deaths exceeding those that would have occurred had previous conditions prevailed,8 was about 1.9 times a normal year's total deaths according to official data.
The quality of China's vital registration in the past, particularly during the period of demographic crisis, has been the topic of frequent debate.9 Based on intercensal adjustment, the completeness of reporting during 1958-62 was estimated to be roughly 85 percent for births and 64 percent for deaths. 10
The 1982 census age distributions are now available for all provinces. However, it is not possible to adjust for reporting errors by employing the intercensal procedure in the absence of detailed data on interprovincial migration, which was extensive, especially in the early period of the Leap. For instance, net outmigrants from Hunan Province during 1959-61 reportedly amounted to more than 1.5 million, or about 4 percent of the province's total population. " I It is also implausible that the magnitude of misreporting was the same in all provinces, given disparities among them in education, administrative efficiency, and the like.
However, our focus is on the regional patterns of mortality crisis rather than on estimation of the exact number of excess deaths. If we make the assumption that in each province the extent of underreporting on mortality was the same before and throughout the crisis period, the relative magnitude of a province's excess mortality can be conservatively estimated by examining the original statistical data and making only minor adjustment.
The question here is what should be regarded as the mortality level under normal conditions. John Bongaarts and Mead Cain suggest that immediately after an episode of massive excess deaths, the mortality level will be lower than normal because of the impact of Darwinian selection. 12 Thus, the average of crude death rates in 1956 and 1957, the years immediately before the Great Leap, has been taken as the reference. Excess mortality, then, can be estimated by assuming that, in the absence of the crisis, mortality would have remained constant at the pre-Leap level. Such a criterion may underestimate the excess deaths, since mortality might have been expected to continue its decline absent the crisis.
The time series of provincial mortality data for the period concerned are not available for all provinces. It is possible, however, to draw a picture based on information for 18 of China's provinces. The national data also show us that the rural population suffered greater excess mortality than did the urban population. Unfortunately, provincial data on mortality are not available for rural and urban populations separately. Because an overwhelming majority of China's population-more than 80 percent-live in rural areas, the provincial death rate is mainly determined by the situation in the countryside.
Regional differences in mortality levels were marked during the preLeap period. The reported crude death rates in 1957 for 28 provinces (data for Tibet are not available) in mainland China ranged from a low of 6 per thousand in Shanghai to a high of 16 per thousand in Yunnan.'3 Apart from these extremes, the crude death rate for most provinces ranged between 9 and 13 per thousand.
Excess mortality occurred in all provinces. Its duration, however, varied substantially, ranging from two years in Xinjiang and Henan to five years in Jilin, Shandong, and Sichuan (see Table 2 ). The extreme length of the mortality crisis in some provinces must be set against their very low crude death rates in the reference period, which may reflect reality or simply reporting errors.
In 1958, while mortality levels in most provinces remained constant or continued to decline, crude death rates in five of the 18 provinces for which data are available rose by at least 5 percent. The mortality crisis seems to have started much earlier in Sichuan and Gansu. One can see from Table 2 that while all 18 provinces experienced some excess mortality in 1959, the situation in Sichuan, Guangxi, and Guizhou was extreme. The crude death rate reached 47 per thousand in Sichuan, 31 in Guangxi, and 20 in Guizhou.
Six provinces recorded crude death rates exceeding 20 per thousand in 1960. The most severely affected provinces were once again Sichuan (54 per thousand) and Guizhou (52 per thousand). The crude death rates in those two provinces in 1960 were more than four times their precrisis levels. In contrast, the death rate in Heilongjiang Province was only 2.4 percent higher in 1960 than in the reference period. The situation improved somewhat in 1961, but crude death rates in Sichuan and Guizhou were still as high as 29 and 23 per thousand, respectively.
The cumulative magnitude of excess mortality by province, estimated by summing the annual relative excesses in crude death rates, varied more widely. In eight of the 18 provinces with data available, the sum of excess mortality was less than a normal year's total deaths, while in six other provinces it was 1.0-2.5 years. In the remaining four provinces, the excess deaths amounted to more than three times a normal year's total. Mortality in Sichuan Province was extremely high, with total excess mortality during the period 1958-62 amounting to more than nine years' worth of normal mortality.
Time series of data on crude death rates are not available for the remaining provinces. But these provinces can be broadly grouped, based on fragmentary information that I gathered. Jiangxi Province is unlikely to have experienced severe mortality crisis. While almost all provinces experienced negative population growth in 1961, the rate of natural increase in Jiangxi was still as high as 10 per thousand. 14 Zhejiang, Hubei, and Fujian are believed to have experienced patterns similar to that in Jiangsu Province,15 in which the rate of natural increase was positive. That the situation in Neimonggu was also not severe can be inferred from the large flow of inmigrants during that period. 16 The excess mortality in Anhui was reportedly similar to that in Sichuan Province. 17 Figure 2 shows the estimated regional patterns of the mortality crisis. As can be seen, the western part of China, from Gansu in the north to Guizhou The total population in these 14 provinces accounted for about 61 percent of the national total during that period. Therefore, assuming that the experience for the remaining provinces was on average similar to those we measured and that the underreporting of deaths was some 10 percent higher during the crisis than in the preceding period, the total number of excess deaths for China as a whole may have amounted to 23 million. This is a very rough estimate that should be interpreted with great caution.
The reliability of some provincial data is open to question. In addition, estimation of national figures from provincial data may introduce distortion. More work is necessary to reconstruct China's population history for this period.20
We may conclude from the foregoing discussion that the demographic consequences of the Great Leap Forward were severe, both in terms of massive fertility reduction and in terms of excess mortality.
Provinces with heavy birth deficits in general suffered severe excess mortality as well. In the northern provinces of Heilongjiang and Shanxi no significant crisis was recorded. Central China suffered the longest and most severe demographic crisis in terms of both fertility and mortality. The southwestern province of Sichuan experienced the heaviest fertility loss and the greatest excess deaths of any province during the period.
What caused this demographic crisis? One direct impact of the Great Leap on daily life was the nationwide food shortage, which, as one might expect, was in part responsible for the demographic crisis. Recent work on the effects of famine, however, has stressed that it can occur in the absence of a significant decline in food availability. Amartya Sen argues that some famines have been brought about mainly through entitlement failure rather than through declines in food availability.2' In the case of China, however, the causes of famine were more complicated than Sen's analysis might suggest. We show in the following section that China's 1959-61 famine was a consequence of a combination of the decline in grain production, entitlement failure, and changes in consumption patterns, all of which were directly connected with the Great Leap Forward. of the Great Leap
Food supply and consumption patterns
The Chinese diet is largely dependent on foodgrains. According to an estimate by Vaclav Smil, about 90 percent of the caloric content and 80 percent of the protein intake in the Chinese diet comes from grains.22 Therefore, China's food problem was largely a grain problem.
In 1953 the Chinese government assumed control over grain production and consumption, instituting a rationing system known as central purchase and supply. Shortly after the launch of the Great Leap in 1958, the free market for grain trade was abolished; and although the free market was reopened in the early 1960s, it was still strictly controlled by the state. This suggests that market mechanisms by and large were not involved in determining grain consumption in China during the period in question.
Under the central purchase and supply system, an individual's grain consumption was primarily determined by the classification of his household as agricultural or nonagricultural.23 Grain consumption for most of the agricultural population was dependent on local grain production and government grain procurement, consisting of an agricultural tax, central purchase, and optional sales. In circumstances such as natural disaster, the state provided some subsidiary grain, but in general the agricultural population was responsible for feeding itself. By contrast, the chief source of grain for the nonagricultural population, most of it urban, was government supply. Urban residents received a fixed ration of grain at a fixed price. Thus, they could always rely on the state no matter what the size of the last harvest. In other words, basic food availability for this part of the population was guaranteed so long as no cut in grain rations occurred. Rural households located in non-grain-producing areas received grain supplies from the state on the same principle as the urban population. China was a net grain-exporting country until 1961; therefore, during the period in question grain consumption for these two populations was determined primarily by grain procurement and state grain storage. 
Causes of the decline in grain production
Many factors were responsible for the decline in grain production. In a country like China, with an agrarian society and a backward agricultural technology, climate has a decisive effect on food availability. Observers in the West once referred to China as the "land of famine' 9;26 natural disaster has continually visited the country.
The impact of natural disaster on grain production was significant during 1959-61. Prolonged drought, heavy flooding, and other natural calamities severely damaged agricultural production.27 Nevertheless, the impact of natural disaster on grain production during the Great Leap should not be overstated. According to government statistics, the disaster-affected areas-areas where crop production was reduced by more than 30 percent from the reference level due to natural disaster-comprised 13. Except where land was converted to industrial use, the reduction in the grain-sown area was the result mainly of changes in government agricultural policy. In 1958 many signs indicated a bumper harvest, and a "wind of exaggeration" blew throughout the country. At one point, reported grain output from the provincial level reached the incredible figure of 500 million tons32-some 2.5 times the actual figure. Falsely informed, the Chinese government thought the food problem had been solved, and the question remaining was not how to produce enough grain but how to consume it. Directives were issued from the center, and a system called "three-three," coupled with the principle of "Sowing less and harvesting more,"33 was introduced. Under this system, one-third of the arable land was to be used for grain crops, one-third for cash crops, and the remaining third for rotation. There was some resistance, and some provincial authorities proceeded cautiously in implementing the policy.34 Nevertheless, a major contraction in the grain-sown areas occurred, resulting in the sharp decline in grain output.
The government soon realized that the system was not working, and some land was returned to grain cultivation in 1960. Although the grain-sown area in China as a whole was still smaller than in pre-Leap years, arable land used for grain production did expand impressively in six provinces. In Xinjiang, the grain-sown area in 1960 increased by 65 percent. The slogan became "Sowing more and harvesting more." The impact of the contraction of grainsown areas on grain production declined, but the national figures show that the contraction of grain-sown areas still accounted for 35 and 40 percent of the reduction in grain production in 1960 and 1961, respectively. Thus, the contraction in grain-sown areas must be considered one of the decisive causes of the decline in grain output during the crisis period, especially in 1959.
Other factors aggravated the situation. Uniform methods of agricultural production were introduced, regardless of differences in local environment, and application of these methods was often counterproductive.35 With the progress of the campaign for steel and iron, millions of members of the commune labor force-usually the best workers-were diverted from agricultural activities to mine coal and produce iron in badly built backyard blast furnaces. In addition, rural-to-urban migration was high in the early years of the Leap, as a result of the great expansion in industrial construction and the relaxation of central control of labor recruitment. The rural labor force remaining in agriculture was decimated, not only in absolute numbers but also in quality, since many workers were inexperienced or physically weak. The ratio of agricultural to industrial labor declined sharply and suddenly, from 13. Table 3 ). In 1958 per capita grain output for China as Generally speaking, the regional patterns of inequality in per capita grain output persisted throughout the crisis period. Provinces with higher per capita outputs in the pre-Leap years maintained their positions during the crisis, but at much lower levels. In only three provinces-Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Yunnan-was per capita grain output consistently higher than 260 kg. In another six provinces-Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Anhui, Hunan, Fujian, and Shanxi-output per capita exceeded 200 kg. throughout the period. The former five were all southeastern provinces. In Hebei, Henan, and Shandong Provinces, per capita grain output was consistently below 200 kg. In the remaining provinces, output levels fluctuated during the period.
Government grain procurement
Grain procurement is one of the major policy measures adopted by the Chinese government to control grain production and consumption. It both guarantees grain supplies to the nonagricultural population and equalizes rural grain consumption. In the absence of a free market in grain, procurement became one of the major determinants of consumption. Before the Great Leap Forward, government procurement amounted to roughly 25 percent of the total grain output. Discounting grain resold by the state to the rural population, the net procurement rate was about 16 percent. As a result, heavy pressures were exerted on the government to control and redistribute more grain. Such pressures would inevitably result in higher procurement levels unless grain imports from abroad increased.
Moreover, the government, as already stated, was misled by vastly inflated production reports. As is well known, in the extraordinary political atmosphere of that time output figures were widely exaggerated. As politics took command over the statistical reporting system, that system almost ceased to work. The total grain output reported in 1958 initially amounted to more than 500 million tons. Although the figure was later revised downward, the first published figure of 375 million tons was still double the 1957 grain output. Many people suspected these reports of being erroneous, but in the political atmosphere of the Leap few people wanted to challenge them. The "wind of exaggeration" blew continually in 1959, leading the central government to believe that more grain could be purchased from the peasants.
The formation of communes facilitated grain procurement. Having successfully completed the formation of higher stage agricultural producers' cooperatives in 1956, China prematurely pursued the more ambitious step of communization starting in the spring of 1958. The communization movement accelerated soon after the Beidaihei Conference held in August of that year. By November 1958, 120 million peasant households, or 99 percent of the rural population, had reportedly joined communes.45 The commune was praised for its large scale and public ownership. Early in the moveinent the typical commune consisted of more than 5,000 households. The basic accounting unit was the brigade, or in some cases even the entire commune.46 The household lost its importance as a unit of production and management, taxation, and consumption. The commune owned the land, managed production, and controlled the output of farm products. Thus, the unit that the government dealt with in grain procurement was no longer the individual household or the small collective, but rather the large-scale commune.
In addition, local officials-especially commune cadres, sometimes under strong pressures-were eager to record achievements that were viewed as measures of political commitment and means to career promotion. Farm production was greatly exaggerated. Grain was oversold to the state, leaving less for consumption by commune members. In this way, rural institutional changes implemented during the early stage of communization enabled the state to mobilize and procure large amounts of grain with seeming ease.47
In sum, the Great Leap Forward created a greater demand for grain; promoted the illusion that more surplus grain was available; and finally, through institutional change, made grain procurement by the central government easier. These factors worked together to produce an unprecedentedly high level of procurement, especially in 1959. However, the government was still unable to meet the increased need. The grain trade deficit was 6.2 million tons in 1960 and 6 million tons in 1961. 48 The government had to dip into grain reserves to feed the rapidly expanding urban population and to carry out the As data on provincial grain consumption are not available, we estimate instead grain availability per capita for agricultural and nonagricultural populations.6' The term "grain availability" in this article refers to grain available to a given population group after government procurement. The grain available for the agricultural population is estimated by subtracting net grain procurement from total grain output.62 Grain for the nonagricultural population is derived from statistics on grain supplies to urban and mining areas. It should be noted that neither of these figures measures real consumption. A certain proportion of the urban grain supply was used by industry to make such nonfood products as starch, and some was used for animal feed. Grain available to the rural population includes grain used for seed, livestock feed, and human consumption.
Per capita grain availabilities for the rural and urban populations are calculated for nine provinces (see Table 4 ). Before the Great Leap, grain available to the agricultural population following government procurement ranged from about 197 kg. per capita in Henan to 417 kg. in Heilongjiang. Grain availability per capita for agricultural populations in Sichuan and Hebei was around 200 kg. For the remaining five provinces the figures were within the range of 217-317 kg. Thus, even after government intervention, the inequality of rural grain consumption was still pronounced, and a large proportion of China's agricultural population lived at bare subsistence levels.
The situation deteriorated during the Great Leap period. In 1959 all nine provinces experienced a reduction in per capita grain availability exceeding 22 percent (see Table 5 Per capita availability was generally higher for urban than for rural populations. But there were exceptions. In Liaoning, for example, per capita grain availability in the reference period was 250 kg. for the nonagricultural population but 318 kg. for the agricultural population. Provincial differences in grain availability for the nonagricultural population were smaller than those for the agricultural population, but they were still substantial. In the reference period, the highest per capita grain availability for an urban population was 387 kg. in Hebei. This level was 75 percent higher than the lowest level of 222 kg. in Sichuan; for the rural population the highest level was 2.16 times the lowest.
The most prominent feature of Table 4 is the smaller decline in grain availability for the urban population than the rural population. In 1959 in four out of nine provinces per capita grain availability for the rural population was Postponement of marriages has been stressed by several writers as a major factor in the fertility deficit during famine. Our analyses of provincial trends in the total first marriage rate and the mean age at first marriage demonstrate that postponement of marriage occurred in most Chinese provinces immediately after the onset of the food shortage in 1959. Typically the marriage deficit lasted for only a year, however, and was followed by a quick and sharp recovery. By 1961 total first marriage rates had returned to, or even exceeded, the levels recorded during the mid-1950s in most provinces, although the food shortage had reached its most serious level. Even though there was a real postponement of marriage and the single-year marriage deficit in some cases was severe, the overall impact of delayed marriage was very small for the period 1959-61 as a whole.
No satisfactory data exist on divorce during the period under consideration. But we know that in Gansu Province the divorce rate rose sharply during the crisis period, especially in rural areas. It is estimated that about 30-40 percent, and in some places even 60 percent, of the divorces in Gansu were caused by the famine. 68 The situation in other provinces is believed to have been similar. Moreover, separations must have occurred when one partner migrated to find work and food for the family. Interprovincial migration occurred on a very large scale, sometimes involving millions of people in a single year. For example, net inmigrants to Neimonggu reportedly totaled more than one million in 1960. By contrast, Shandong lost 1.6 million people to outmigration in 1960.69 Women accounted for a sizable proportion of this movement. Reportedly two-fifths of the migrants to Gansu during the first nine months of 1961 were women. This female outmigration created social problems: after the crisis, local governments signed agreements to send married women back to their husbands. 70 Thus, famine-induced separation was one of the causes of the fertility deficit.
Our analysis also shows that higher order births were more likely to have been postponed than other births. Compared with the reference years, the national figure for first birth intervals increased by 12 percent and that for second birth intervals by 28 percent. Some studies also suggest that during the crisis, progression to higher order births declined more than progression to lower order births.71 Apart from biological reasons, this pattern may also result from the fact that newly married couples were less likely than long-married couples to accept abstinence or abortion voluntarily.
Consumption patterns and excess mortality
The magnitude of excess mortality is closely connected with the severity of food shortage. However, the data in Table 3 and other provincial data on per capita grain output suggest that low yearly grain availability or consumption did not invariably lead to excess deaths. Grain availability for the agricultural population in Hebei Province during the crisis was as limited as in Sichuan and Henan, but the extent of excess deaths in the former was much smaller than in the latter two provinces. Moreover, the largest excess mortality did not always occur at the time of worst grain supply. For instance, in Henan grain availability reached its nadir for both rural and urban populations in 1961, but the crude death rate in that year was normal. The situation in Jiangsu, and probably in Sichuan as well, was similar. It is also interesting to note that grain supply in 1962 did not improve substantially and was still much lower than the pre-Leap level in almost all provinces; however, fertility recovered considerably, and a baby boom was in the making. Levels of mortality, as measured by the crude death rate, returned to normal. In many provinces crude death rates in 1962 fell below the preLeap levels. These anomalies suggest that many factors other than famine were responsible for the crisis.
A major change in consumption patterns is probably one of the most important factors. This change was another consequence of the Leap. With the establishment of the people's communes in late 1958, rural community dining rooms, or public mess halls, were established throughout the country. The primary aim of the mess halls was to liberate female labor from housework, thereby diverting it to productive activities. In addition, the promotion of mess halls marked the first effort to organize collective consumption, which was described as a step toward a true communist society.72 Food was to be managed and distributed not by the household but by the community. In other words, food provision and consumption were centralized.
Mess halls brought great changes in the peasants' grain consumption. Chinese peasants had struggled for food for centuries. Even in 1987, according to the government, there were 40 million peasants living at subsistence levels, which means they are still trying to solve the problem of getting enough to eat.73 In most periods peasant households have had to plan their yearly grain consumption carefully according to the harvest, frequently finding substitute foods, such as vegetables, potatoes, and gourds. This situation was suddenly changed by the establishment of mess halls. Free supply of foodgrains to commune members was widely accepted as a major portion-usually 70-80 percent-of the commune's wage system.74 The slogan then was "Eat as much as you like, and do as much as you can." Mess halls were praised by the peasants as "iron rice bowls." As the age-old fear of famine seemed to have vanished, overconsumption became a common feature of the mess halls. The logic was very simple, since the commune promised to provide food for every member.
It was said that in some rural areas the grain consumed by peasants in a three-month period amounted to what usually sufficed for six months. According to an estimate prepared by the Chinese economist Xue Muqiao, in the first year of the communization movement the overconsumption of grain among China's rural population amounted to about 17.5 million tons,75 equivalent to 8.75 percent of the total grain output in 1958. The mess hall was a new phenomenon in China's countryside, and mismanagement at the early stage was inevitable. Nevertheless, overconsumption, along with the concealment of grain output by peasants, which was universally practiced at that time, 76 should be seen not as peasant greed or selfishness, but as a form of active resistance to, and self-preservation in the face of, high procurement levels.
The commune mess halls were short-lived. But by mid-1960, 99 percent of peasant households in Henan and 94 percent in Guizhou were still eating in such halls.77 Ironically, almost all the provinces that were praised by a People's Daily article for their "good performance" in establishing rural mess halls experienced severe excess mortality. 78 In many marginal areas peasants were accustomed to consuming less grain in the slack season in order to have enough for the busy seasons. With the progress of the Leap, large squads of rural laborers were organized by the commune to undertake water conservation, road building, and steel melting. Since much of this work involved heavy physical labor and was conducted in the winter, which was traditionally the slack season, the old consumption pattern was broken. Although peasants who worked on those projects could obtain some grain subsidies from the state, the major part of their grain supplies came from the communes. This certainly led to an increased demand for grain, especially when laborers were given double rations. 79 In the urban areas control over food rations was relaxed in the early stage of the Leap. Retail sales of grain to the urban residents in the first eight months of 1959 were reported to be 13.6 percent higher than those for the same period in 1958. 80 Urban residents might have used some of that grain to help their rural relatives. Nevertheless, it was estimated that about 5 million tons of grain was overconsumed by the urban population. Together with grain that was overallocated for seeds-another consequence of mismanagement81-the total volume of overused grain in the first year of the Leap amounted to more than 32.5 million tons, or about 16 percent of that year's total grain output. 82 The change in consumption patterns obviously aggravated the grain problem. Thus, in China famine occurred not only because of entitlement failure, but also because of failure in consumption arrangements. Since the major cause of the disaster was policy error, the principal aim of the adjustment was to make necessary institutional and economic changes. Several strict measures were adopted. The urban population and the labor force employed by the state were greatly reduced. Most of the newly recruited rural labor force was sent back to the countryside. Many industrial projects and some water conservation projects were cut back. The government's grain procurement program was considerably reduced, and a large amount of grain was imported from abroad. Within the newly established communes, the basic accounting unit was shifted down to the production team, and the public mess halls were closed. 84 No direct large-scale famine relief operation was undertaken, since the problem was so widespread that disaster relief would have put tremendous strain on already overextended state resources. Instead, the government removed the barriers to agricultural production and let the peasants help themselves. From a demographic viewpoint, this measure worked very successfully. Although agricultural production recovered slowly and the grain supply did not return to the pre-Leap level until 1965, mortality returned to normal levels soon after this measure was implemented, and an unprecedented fertility boom followed in 1963. This would seem to confirm that the demographic crisis during the Great Leap period was mainly caused by erroneous government policy decisions (on top of natural disasters), as well as by hastily introduced institutional changes and innovations for which China was ill prepared. 
Appendix

